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1  Introduction 
 
The recent rise of China has been associated with its (re-)integration with the world 
trading system. In some circles, China is now known as the “factory of the world”, 
producing a large proportion of the world’s manufactured goods (see for example The 
Economist (2015)). A concurrent trend has been the increasing fragmentation of 
production, as final goods are assembled from intermediate inputs which themselves 
are produced in different parts of the world (Jones (2000)). The article in The 
Economist cited above suggests a link between China’s rise and its role in the global 
value chain. Nevertheless, Hsieh and Ossa (2016) find only small effects on real 
income in the rest of the world, of China’s productivity increase since the mid-1990s.  
 
There is of course a large theoretical and empirical literature on the importance of 
intermediates trade. The theoretical side has been dominated by models of 
monopolistic competition and economic geography (see the synthesis provided by 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Fujita et al (1999)). On the empirical side, 
Miroudot et al (2009) and Sturgeon and Memedovic (2010) show that intermediate 
inputs represent over half of total goods trade, but that this fraction has actually 
decreased since the 1960s. Implicit in the discussion about the role of China in the 
world trading system is the effect of China’s size. The role of country size in 
determining the importance of intermediate goods trade has not heretofore been 
discussed in the literature, and is the main focus of the present paper.  
 
Divide all commodities into consumption goods and intermediate goods (where goods 
are classified according to the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification; more 
details are in Appendix A). Figure 1 shows that, in 2012, there is a negative 
relationship between the share of consumption goods in total exports, and the size of 
the economy as measured by real GDP. That is, on average, a larger country exports 
a larger fraction of intermediate goods, and a smaller fraction of consumption goods. 
The correlation coefficient is -0.3008, with a p-value of 0.0005. Note that both China 
and India are outliers; they have much larger shares of consumption goods in their 
exports than would be predicted given their size. More formal econometric evidence 
using a panel of 170 countries from 1995 to 2014 is presented in Appendix A, and 
supports the results of Figure 1.  
 
The objective of this paper is to develop a simple theoretical model to explain the 
negative relationship between country size and the share of consumption goods trade.  
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Two final goods can be produced using intermediate inputs which are produced using 
labour as the only factor of production. As in Adam Smith (1776), the more the 
production process can be divided into different stages, the larger will be the final 
output. The division of labour is combined with Ricardo’s (1817) comparative 
advantage, so that countries specialise in different subsets of intermediate goods, 
then trade both intermediate and final goods. We show two main results. First, we 
show the relationship between the division of labour and comparative advantage in 
international trade. Large countries gain relatively more from comparative advantage 
than from the division of labour, while the opposite is true for small countries. 
Second, and consistent with the empirical evidence, country size is negatively 
associated with the share of consumption goods in its exports (equivalently, is 
positively associated with the share of intermediate goods in its exports).  
 
There has been a recent resurgence of interest in models of international trade based 
on the division of labour. A large portion of this literature revolves around models 
based on external scale economies, for instance Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010) 
and Ethier and Ruffin (2009). Choi and Yu (2003) survey the earlier literature on 
international trade under external scale economies. Relative to this literature, the 
present paper develops an explicit model of the division of labour, rather than basing 
it on external economies. Also closely related to the present paper are Swanson 
(1999), Zhou (2004), and Chaney and Ossa (2013). Swanson (1999) develops a model 
in which a larger market size leads to productivity gains, because workers specialize 
in a narrower subset of activities. Zhou (2004) develops a very different model which 
makes a similar point. Chaney and Ossa (2013) extend the new trade model of 
Krugman (1979) to allow for multiple production stages. However, Swanson (1999) 
does not explicitly consider the implications of international trade; the structure of 
the model means that this is not a straightforward analysis. In addition, unlike Zhou 
(2004) and Chaney and Ossa (2013), our model is based on perfect competition, so 
presents an alternative approach to the division of labour. In this sense the paper is 
related to Haveman and Hummels (2004), who provide an alternative explanation to 
the standard explanation of the gravity model of trade, and Davis (1995, 1997), who 
provides an alternative explanation for intra-industry trade (Davis, 1995) and trade 
between similar countries (Davis, 1997).    
 
Also closely related to the present paper are Ethier (1979, 1982). The nature of the 
division of labour in this paper is similar to that in Ethier (1979, 1982). The main 
difference is that here, we explicitly model the division of labour as in Ethier (1982), 
but the production of intermediate inputs is perfectly competitive, whereas Ethier 
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(1982) assumes monopolistic competition in the production of intermediate goods. 
Indeed, where Ethier (1982) has two sources of scale economies (internal to the firm, 
and due to the division of labour) and one source of comparative advantage (factor 
endowment differences across countries), in the present paper, there is one source of 
comparative advantage (between final goods), and one source of scale economies (the 
division of labour). In addition, whilst in Ethier (1982) there is, by assumption, no 
trade in final goods, here we allow for trade in both intermediate and final goods.  
 
The model developed in Ethier (1982) was later used in a dynamic setting in the 
literature on endogenous growth (see especially Romer (1987) and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991)). In addition to providing the foundations for technological progress 
in the neoclassical growth model, Grossman and Helpman (1991) also endogenise the 
development of new varieties of intermediate inputs, which is the outcome of firms’ 
decisions to engage in research and development. Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) 
theoretical analysis of international technology diffusion has been examined 
empirically by Keller (2002a, 2002b; see also Keller’s (2004) survey), who finds 
evidence of technological diffusion through trade in intermediate inputs, but also that 
technological spillovers are mainly local rather than global in nature. The insights 
from this literature are clearly important, but for simplicity we abstract from these 
issues in this paper.   
 
The next section develops the model and outlines the autarkic equilibrium. Section 3 
considers the implications of international trade, and the pattern of trade. Section 4 
compares the results of the model, with a version of the model based on monopolistic 
competition. Section 5 provides some concluding comments.  
 
2 The model  
 
In this section we outline the features of a simple model of international trade in 
which countries may export both intermediate and final goods. There are two 
interesting results of the model. First, it shows the relationship between the division 
of labour and comparative advantage. Second, it predicts a negative relationship 
between the size of the economy and the consumption goods share of exports as 
documented in Figure 1.  
 
There are two countries, 𝑗𝑗 = 𝐻𝐻,𝐹𝐹 for Home and Foreign. Labour is the only factor of 
production. The two countries have labour endowments 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗. All markets are perfectly 
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competitive. There are two final consumption goods, 1 and 2. Consumer utility is 
identical across countries and takes a Cobb-Douglas form:  
𝑈𝑈 = 𝐶𝐶1𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶21−𝜃𝜃                                         0 < 𝜃𝜃 < 1    (1) 
Where 𝐶𝐶 denotes consumption of a good. Final goods are produced with intermediate 
inputs. Each country has the ability to produce a number of intermediate inputs3:  
 𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 = 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗      (2) 
where 𝑟𝑟 < 1 is a constant across countries (we ignore the integer constraint on 𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗), 
each intermediate input is assumed to be different from all other intermediate inputs, 
and 𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 is small relative to the number of possible intermediate inputs. That is, the 
number of intermediate inputs a country can produce depends on the size of the 
labour force. There are at least two possible reasons for this. First, different groups of 
workers may have skills for producing different intermediate inputs, so the larger the 
labour force, the greater the variety of skills and hence intermediate goods available4. 
Second, there may be unmodelled intermediate-specific inputs (for instance, natural 
resources), so that, again, a larger country with a greater variety of natural resources 
would be able to produce more types of intermediate inputs. This idea relates to the 
literature which shows that larger countries are more diverse (Alesina and Spolaore 
(2003)). The parameter 𝑟𝑟 is a scaling factor which drops out of most expressions later 
on. It may be thought of as the intrinsic degree of specialisation in the economy; a 
larger value of 𝑟𝑟 implies a larger number of intermediate inputs for a given size of the 
labour force, so that the economy is more specialised.  
 
As a result of equation (2), the number of intermediate goods produced by each 
country (hence the extent of the division of labour) is proportional to the size of the 
market, as in Adam Smith’s example. The assumption that larger countries produce 
a larger variety of goods has empirical support from Hummels and Klenow (2005) 
and Hanson (2012). Let the production technology of intermediate inputs be identical 
across countries:  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗       (3) 
Production of intermediate inputs occurs under constant returns to scale. Each 
intermediate input is produced by a large number of perfectly competitive firms. As 
                                                          
3 From a technical perspective, this assumption is needed to pin down the number of intermediate 
goods produced in an economy. Without this assumption, under perfect competition with constant 
returns to scale in the production of intermediate goods and increasing returns in the number of 
varieties, the optimal number of varieties is infinite.  
4 Swanson (1999) endogenises the specialisation of workers into different activities. This extension of 
the model is left to future work.  
6 
 
a result of equation (3) and perfect competition, the price of each intermediate good 
is equal to the wage rate in each country. Since there are no trade costs, there are no 
home market effects of the Krugman (1980) type. Hence, assume that wage rates are 
equalised across countries, so that all intermediate goods have the same price5.  
 
All intermediate inputs are used in fixed proportions in the production of final goods, 
and assembly of final goods is assumed to be costless6. Hence let the production 
functions of the final goods in the two countries be:  
𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝛾𝛾(𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 + 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽+1𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻                               𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻 = (𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 + 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽+1𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻   (4a) 
𝑄𝑄1𝐹𝐹 = (𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 + 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽+1𝑥𝑥1𝐹𝐹                                   𝑄𝑄2𝐹𝐹 = 𝛾𝛾(𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 + 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽+1𝑥𝑥2𝐹𝐹   (4b) 
Output of each final good depends on the number of Home and Foreign produced 
inputs, 𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 and 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹, and the quantity of each intermediate input, 𝑥𝑥. Assume perfect 
knowledge transfer across countries, so that foreign and domestic inputs enter 
symmetrically into production 7 . 𝛾𝛾 > 1  indicates that Home has a comparative 
technological advantage in final good 1, while Foreign has a comparative 
technological advantage in final good 2. 𝛽𝛽 > 0 measures the payoff from the division 
of labour8. The larger the number of intermediate inputs 𝑛𝑛, the greater the division 
of labour, and the larger the output of the final good, analogously to Adam Smith’s 
pin factory example. Note that the production function of final goods exhibits 
constant returns to scale with respect to the quantity of each input, and increasing 
returns with respect to the number of different inputs. The constant returns to scale 
feature makes the production function compatible with perfect competition: a larger 
firm does not have a cost advantage relative to a smaller firm.  
                                                          
5 This is a weaker (and more common) assumption than it may seem at first sight. Introducing an 
additional homogeneous final good as is commonly done in the literature (Helpman and Krugman 
(1985), Fujita et al (1999)) does not obviate the need for this assumption. As Davis (1998) notes, in 
the absence of trade costs, the division of resources between the homogeneous and differentiated goods 
between countries is indeterminate. Even when there are trade costs (as in Helpman and Krugman 
(1985)), the assumption that both countries produce the homogeneous good is needed to ensure wage 
equality across countries.   
6 Alternatively, some of the intermediate inputs may be interpreted as assembly services, so that 
assembly is not costless. This interpretation would leave the results unchanged.  
7 Hence abstracting from the localised nature of knowledge spillovers; see Keller (2002a).  
8 What if 𝛽𝛽 < 0? In this case, there are decreasing returns to the number of different inputs. Hence, 
final goods firms will use the largest quantity of the smallest number of different inputs. In doing this, 
they are constrained by equation (2), so that, in autarky, final good 1 will use all the output of 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 
inputs, while final good 2 will use all the output of (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 inputs. It is possible to trace out the 




Consider the case where the two countries do not trade with each other. Here we 
analyse the Home country; the solution for the Foreign country is analogous. In this 
case, Foreign-produced intermediates are not available for use in the production of 
Home-produced final goods, and all Home-produced intermediates are used at Home. 
Because of the Cobb-Douglas preferences, each country will produce both final goods 
in autarky, and because of constant returns to scale with respect to the quantity of 
each input in final good production, the production possibilities frontier (PPF) is a 
straight line; there are constant opportunity costs. As a result, we can allocate the 
output of each intermediate good to the two final goods based on the parameter of 
the utility function 𝜃𝜃 (see Appendix B for a derivation):  
𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 = 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻                                    𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻 = (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻    (5) 
Where 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 is the output of each intermediate good in Home. Hence, the production 
functions in Home are (making use of equation (2)):  
𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽+1𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 = 𝛾𝛾(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛽𝛽+1𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻     (6a) 
𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻 = 𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽+1(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 = (𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛽𝛽+1(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻    (6b) 
Since all intermediate inputs are produced using the same technology, and since all 
intermediate goods are used in fixed proportions in the production of final goods, the 
labour used in each intermediate input is also the same. Hence from equations (2) 
and (3) we have:  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 = 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 = 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 = 1𝑟𝑟      (7)  
The size of the labour force influences only the number of intermediate goods, not 
the output of each intermediate good. This result of the model is similar to Krugman 
(1980), in which changing labour endowments results in a different number of 
varieties produced, but not the scale of production of each variety.  
  
Substituting equation (7) into the production functions (6a) and (6b) gives:  
𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = (𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻                                    𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻 = (𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻   (8) 
Since there is no international trade, Home consumers can only consume Home-
produced output. Therefore, the Home consumer’s per capita utility under autarky is:  
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻
𝐴𝐴 = (𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛽𝛽(𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜃𝜃)1−𝜃𝜃     (9) 
Per capita utility is increasing in the size of the Home labour force 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  (a larger 
economy benefits from greater division of labour), the parameter 𝑟𝑟 indicating the 
intrinsic degree of specialisation in the economy, the gain from the division of labour 
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𝛽𝛽, and the technology parameter 𝛾𝛾. In addition, utility has a U-shaped relationship 
with the share of final good 1 in expenditure, 𝜃𝜃.  
 
3 International trade 
 
When international trade is allowed, assume there are no trade costs, so that both 
intermediate inputs and final goods can be freely traded across countries. Proposition 
1 shows that both countries are always specialized in free trade:  
 
Proposition 1: In free trade, Home is specialized in final good 1 and Foreign is 
specialized in final good 2.  
 
At first sight, Proposition 1 appears to originate from equations (4a) and (4b) where 
Home has comparative advantage in final good 1, and Foreign in final good 2, as in 
the standard Ricardian model. However, in fact Proposition 1 arises because of 
absolute advantage, not comparative advantage. Because production of final goods 
from intermediate goods does not require any additional resources beyond the 
intermediate goods already produced, if a country is more productive at producing 
both final goods, then the efficient allocation of resources (the integrated equilibrium; 
see Helpman and Krugman (1985)) implies that both final goods will be produced in 
that country9. Effectively, there is no opportunity cost of producing one final good 
instead of the other, but because we assumed in equations (4a) and (4b) that each 
country has a technological advantage in one final good (and constant returns to 
scale with respect to the quantity of each input), each country is completely 
specialized in producing that good.   
 
Making use of the results in the previous section and solving for the production 
functions (4a) and (4b) gives:  
𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)    (10a) 
𝑄𝑄2𝐹𝐹 = 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽 (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)    (10b) 
Production of each final good uses intermediate goods produced in both countries, 
and consumers wish to consume both final goods. Hence international trade occurs in 
both intermediate and final goods10.  
                                                          
9 A similar argument has been made in Davis (1995), who develops a model where one country has an 
(absolute) technological advantage in a good. To replicate the integrated equilibrium, it must be the 
case that the country with the technological advantage, produces the world output of that good.  
10 If trade in intermediate goods is defined to be intra-industry trade, while trade in final goods is 




Since preferences are homothetic and identical across countries, each country will 
consume a fraction of the total output of each final good which is proportional to its 
relative size 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)⁄ . Hence, the Home consumer’s per capita utility under free 
trade is:   
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝛾𝛾(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜃𝜃)1−𝜃𝜃     (11) 
Define the gains from trade as the ratio between free trade (11) and autarkic utility 
(9). The gains from trade for the Home country are: 
𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻 = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 = �𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �𝛽𝛽 𝛾𝛾1−𝜃𝜃 > 1      (12) 
Hence there are gains from trade, which arise from two sources. First, international 
trade leads to more intermediate goods being available, which leads to greater 
division of labour. Second, international trade allows the two countries to specialize 
in their comparative advantage final goods. The following comparative statics results 
can be shown:  
𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
< 0             𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹
> 0             𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝛽𝛽
> 0             𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
> 0             𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝜃𝜃
< 0   (13) 
As might be expected, the gains from trade increase the smaller is the country, or 
the larger is the trading partner. In fact, from equation (11), it can be seen that 
utility under free trade depends on the size of the world economy rather than the size 
of each country, and is identical for both countries. The larger the gains from the 
division of labour 𝛽𝛽 or the larger the comparative technological advantage in the 
final good 𝛾𝛾, the larger the gains from trade. Similarly, the larger the expenditure 
share of final good 1, 𝜃𝜃, the smaller the gains from trade for Home, since Home has 
comparative advantage in good 1.  
 
It is possible to decompose the total gains from trade into the component derived 
from comparative advantage in final goods production and the component derived 
from the division of labour. To obtain the Home country’s gains from trade based on 
comparative advantage alone, set 𝛽𝛽 = 0 in the gains from trade equation (12) to 
obtain:  
𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 = 𝛾𝛾1−𝜃𝜃       (14) 
Similarly, set 𝛾𝛾 = 1 in equation (12) to obtain the Home country’s gains from trade 
based on the division of labour alone:  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in Appendix C, where it is shown that the model’s prediction of the share of intra-industry trade is 
the same as that of the imperfect competition model of Helpman and Krugman (1985).  
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𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 = �𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �𝛽𝛽      (15) 
Total gains from trade are simply the product of the two components:  
𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻 = 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 × 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿      (16) 
Note from equation (14) that the gain from comparative advantage is independent of 
country sizes, whereas from equation (15) the gain from the division of labour 
increases the smaller is the country relative to its trading partner. Hence the primary 
source of the gains from trade for small countries is the division of labour, while for 
large countries it is comparative advantage. We have:  
 
Proposition 2: The smaller is a country relative to its trading partner, the greater the 
importance of the division of labour relative to comparative advantage as a source of 
the gains from trade.  
 
As noted in Section 2 above, the two countries are symmetric in every way except 
one: their size. Similarly, the two final goods and all intermediate goods are also 
symmetric in every way, and international trade and the assembly of final goods 
from intermediate goods are costless. As a result, the total value of intermediate 
goods output is equal to the total value of final goods output, and the two final 
goods are produced in proportion to the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function and have equal prices. However, with identical homothetic preferences, the 
larger country will consume a larger fraction of each final good, in direct proportion 
to the country’s size. As a result, the share of the final good in a country’s exports 
will be negatively related to the country’s size, while the share of intermediate goods 
will be positively related to the country’s size.  
 
To make this more concrete, the value of Home’s exports of the final good is:  
𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹
𝑃𝑃1𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 𝑃𝑃1 �𝑑𝑑𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 � (𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽+1 = 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃1𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽   (17) 
Where 𝑃𝑃1 is the price of good 1. Recall from equation (5) that a fraction 1 − 𝜃𝜃 of 
each Home-produced intermediate good is used in the production of final good 2, 
which is produced in Foreign. The value of Home’s exports of intermediate goods is:  (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 = (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻     (18) 
Where 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 is the price of each intermediate good. The price of each intermediate good 
does not depend on the country’s size. Since we have assumed in Section 2 above 
that wage rates are equal across countries, the prices of intermediate goods are also 
the same across countries and can be normalised to 1. However, the price of the final 
11 
 
good does depend on the size of the world economy, since a larger world economy 
implies more intermediate goods and hence lower production cost through greater 
division of labour. The relative price of the final good can be obtained from the 
assumptions that international trade and the assembly of the final goods are costless 
and profits are zero, so the value of final good output is equal to the value of the 
intermediate inputs used in its production. That is, from equation (10a):  
𝑃𝑃1𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝑃𝑃1𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)    (19) 
While the value of the intermediate inputs used in its production is, substituting 
from equation (5):  
𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻(𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 + 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹)𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 = 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 =  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝜃𝜃   (20) 
If profits are zero, equations (19) and (20) are equal to one another, and setting 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 =1 gives the price of the Home-produced final good as a function of the endowments:  
𝑃𝑃1 = �𝛾𝛾(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽�−1     (21) 
Substituting this into the value of Home’s exports of the final good (17) and 
simplifying gives:  
𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹       (22) 
Combining this with the value of Home’s exports of intermediate goods (18), Home’s 
exports of the final good as a share of Home’s total exports is:  
𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹[𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻]−1     (23) 
Differentiating this expression with respect to 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 gives the relationship between the 
share of final goods exports and country size:  
𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
=  −𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜃𝜃)[𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻]−2 < 0   (24) 
This gives:  
 
Proposition 3: There is a negative relationship between country size and the share of 
final goods in its exports, and a positive relationship between country size and the 
share of intermediate goods in its exports.  
 
Proposition 3 is of course the same as the empirical relationship obtained in Figure 1. 
In fact, since labour is the only factor of production and profits are zero in 
equilibrium, a country’s GDP as measured by the income approach is simply the 
wage income 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 . In Appendix A, we show empirically that the negative 
relationship between country size and the share of final goods in its exports holds 




4 Comparison with the model based on monopolistic competition 
 
Appendix D outlines a version of the model based on monopolistic competition. This 
model is similar to that presented in Krugman (1980) and Ethier (1982). There are 
two points of departure between the model presented in Sections 2 and 3 above, and 
the model in Appendix D. First, in Appendix D, we assume monopolistic competition 
and increasing returns to scale in the production of intermediate goods. This 
compares with the model in the text, which assumes constant returns to scale in 
intermediate goods production. Second, in Appendix D, we assume a Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregator for the production function of the final 
goods. This compares with the production functions (4a) and (4b) which directly 
model the role of the division of labour. The two points of departure enable the 
model in Appendix D to yield an endogenously-determined number of intermediate 
goods, and also to make each firm synonymous with a single variety of intermediate 
good.   
 
It turns out that both models yield the same outcomes11. This can be seen most 
clearly in two cases. First, in both models, the gains from trade arise both from 
comparative advantage, and from the increased number of varieties of intermediate 
inputs. Second, the expression for the share of consumption goods in Home’s total 
exports is exactly the same between the two models. What this suggests, as argued 
in the Introduction, is that it is possible to derive a model of intermediate goods 
trade based on perfect competition, which yields the same results as the more-
conventional model based on monopolistic competition.  
 
To be clear, we do not set out to claim that the perfectly competitive model is 
somehow superior to the model based on monopolistic competition. Instead, what we 
hope to show is that, in this instance, the results obtained using both approaches are 
the same. There are of course instances in which the monopolistic competition model 
is superior, such as in the literature pioneered by Melitz (2003) on firm 
heterogeneity12. Nevertheless, as the recent literature on the gravity model shows 
                                                          
11 This is true as long as the standard CES formulation is used, as is the case in Appendix D. If for 
instance we adopt the specification used in Krugman (1980) for the production functions, viz. 𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 =
𝛾𝛾�∑𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻
𝜌𝜌 + ∑𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝜌𝜌 � and 𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻 = ∑𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻𝜌𝜌 + ∑𝑥𝑥2𝐹𝐹𝜌𝜌 , then it can be shown that the gains from trade arise only 
because of comparative advantage (that is, there are no gains from the increased variety of 
intermediate inputs), while the result for the consumption goods share of trade remains unchanged.  
12 Although even here Bond (1986) shows that is it possible to introduce firm heterogeneity in a 
Heckscher-Ohlin model.  
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(Eaton and Kortum (2002)), there remains a place for models based on comparative 
advantage. Recent developments in empirical methods which are agnostic to the 
market structure (for instance, De Loecker and Warzynski (2012)) may represent an 




In this paper, we document the presence of a negative relationship between the size 
of a country, and the share of consumption goods in its total exports. We develop a 
simple model of international trade which is able to explain this negative 
relationship. The model is based on the division of labour and comparative 
advantage, going beyond the usual assumption of external scale economies to clarify 
the implications of the division of labour. Unlike most of the prior literature, the 
model is perfectly competitive throughout. The extent of the division of labour is 
determined by the size of the market, whereas the gains from international trade 
arise from the division of the production process into increasing numbers of stages 
and from comparative advantage in final goods. It is shown that large countries gain 
relatively more from comparative advantage than from the division of labour, 
whereas the opposite is true for small countries. Countries exchange intermediate 
inputs which are used in the production of final goods, which are then traded with 
each other. In addition, the model predicts, consistently with the empirical evidence, 
that larger countries will have a smaller share of consumption goods in their exports, 
and a larger share of intermediate goods. It is shown in Appendix D that the 
perfectly competitive model developed in the paper yields the same outcomes as a 
model based on monopolistic competition.  
 
The model developed in this paper relies quite heavily on several strong assumptions, 
especially those regarding the production of intermediate inputs and final goods. As 
discussed in the paper, these assumptions help sidestep some analytically difficult 
issues. Future work will address these issues directly, as well as developing a more 
general approach that would be amenable to the analysis of related issues such as 
trade costs. Nevertheless, the present paper helps to shed some light not only on the 
relationship between country size and intermediate goods trade, but also on the role 
of the division of labour, and the relationship between the division of labour and 
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Appendix A: Econometric analysis 
 
In this Appendix, we develop an econometric model to provide further evidence on 
the negative relationship between country size and the share of consumption goods in 
international trade. The data used for the empirical analysis has been obtained from 
the UN Comtrade database, for all available countries between 1995 and 2014. We 
make use of the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification which divides all 
commodities into capital goods, intermediate goods, consumption goods, and 
“unclassified” (see United Nations (2002) for details of the classification). For our 
analysis, we drop the “unclassified” category, and exclude agricultural and mining 
products from the sample, before calculating the share of each type of good in total 
exports13. It may be argued that agricultural and mining products make less use of 
intermediate inputs than manufactured products, so their inclusion may influence the 
results. Our sample is an unbalanced panel of 170 countries, and, in the sample, the 
share of consumption goods in total exports is 23.9%, while the share of intermediate 
goods is 56.6%, and the share of capital goods is 19.4%. We use two measures of 
country size: real GDP at constant 2011 national prices, and total labour 
compensation in the economy (calculated as the share of labour compensation in 
GDP, multiplied by real GDP). In the one-factor model in the text, these two 
measures are identical, since all national income is labour income; empirically, they 
may differ depending on factors such as capital endowments, although the correlation 
between the two measures is 0.99. Both measures are obtained from the Penn World 
Tables 9.0 (Feenstra et al, 2015).  
 




� = 𝛼𝛼0𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2 ln 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡    (A1) 
Where 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is exports of consumption goods, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is total exports, of country 𝑆𝑆 in 
year 𝑡𝑡. We include both country and year fixed effects 𝛼𝛼0𝑖𝑖 and 𝛼𝛼1𝑡𝑡 , to control for 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across countries (for example, differences in 
industrial structure across countries), and country-invariant heterogeneity across 
time (for instance, shocks which are common across countries). By controlling for 
both country and year fixed effects, the coefficient on ln 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is identified through 
across-time variation within country. That is, 𝛼𝛼2 shows how the consumption share 
of exports changes as a country’s size changes. The specification in (A1) helps to 
                                                          
13 Including the “unclassified” category and agricultural and mining products leads to qualitatively 
similar results to those reported below.  
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address one potential concern from Figure 1: because Figure 1 uses cross-sectional 
data, the relationship obtained may be driven by some unobserved cross-sectional 
differences across countries.  
 
Changes in the structure of the economy (for instance, the de-industrialisation of 
many developed economies) may also influence the consumption share of exports. To 
control for this, we also include a set of country-specific time trends, giving the 




� = 𝛼𝛼0𝑖𝑖 + (𝛼𝛼0𝑖𝑖 × 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) + 𝛼𝛼1𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2 ln 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   (A2) 
The results from regressing equations (A1) and (A2), making use of both size 
measures, are reported in Table A1. Controlling for country fixed effects (columns 
(1) and (4)), both GDP and labour compensation are negatively and significantly 
related to the consumption goods share of exports. A one percent increase in GDP 
reduces the consumption goods share of exports by about 0.06 percent, with labour 
compensation having a slightly smaller effect. Including year fixed effects (columns 
(2) and (5)) reduces the significance in both cases, while adding a country-specific 
time trend (columns (3) and (6)) restores the statistical significance of GDP14.  
 
We perform three sensitivity checks on the results of Table A1. First, note that the 
sample is an unbalanced panel; with 170 countries and 20 years, a balanced panel 
would have 3,400 observations, but Table 1 only has 2,583 observations (fewer 
countries and observations are available when using labour compensation). Therefore, 
we may be concerned with non-random sample attrition. To address this concern, we 
perform the analysis with a panel which includes only countries with at least 12 
observations. This reduces the number of countries, to 144, and the number of 
observations, to 2,429, but increases the average number of observations per country, 
from 15.2 to 16.9.  
 
A second concern is that the regression analysis in Table A1 gives equal importance 
to all countries in the sample. We consider two approaches to addressing this 
concern. First, we perform a regression in which the observations are weighted by the 
natural log of population, so that larger countries are given greater weight in the 
regression15. Second we drop all countries which are in the bottom decile in terms of 
population and GDP; this corresponds to a population threshold of approximately 
                                                          
14 It is possible that both size measures are endogenous in equations (A1) and (A2). However, whilst 
total exports may influence size, it is not immediately obvious how the structure of exports would do 
so.  
15 Alternative weights, such as the natural log of GDP, yield very similar results.  
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600,000 people and a GDP threshold of approximately $8.1 billion. This results in 
the exclusion of 43 countries in total; these are mainly small island states such as 
Seychelles and Samoa, but also includes a few wealthy but small countries such as 
Brunei and Luxembourg.  
 
The results of these sensitivity analyses are reported in Table A2, where the same 
specifications as Table A1 are reported: country size is measured either with real 
GDP or labour compensation, with country fixed effects only, with country and year 
fixed effects, and with country and year fixed effects and country-specific time 
trends. Panel A reports the results of the more balanced sample; Panel B reports the 
results of the weighted regression; and Panel C reports the results of dropping small 
countries. In all cases we get very similar results to those reported in Table A1. In 
particular, both measures of size are always negatively (albeit not always 
significantly) related to the consumption goods share of exports. This suggests that 




Table A1: The relationship between the consumption share of exports and country 
size. Dependent variable = consumption goods share of exports.  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) ln(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃) -0.056 -0.048 -0.106     
 (0.021)** (0.048) (0.038)**     ln(𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟 𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝)     -0.049 -0.025 -0.039 
     (0.021)* (0.035) (0.025) 
𝑅𝑅2 0.03 0.03 0.46  0.02 0.04 0.49 
𝑁𝑁 × 𝑇𝑇  2,583 2,583 2,583  2,093 2,093 2,093 
N 170 170 170  130 130 130 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Country time trend   Yes    Yes 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors clustered by country. + Significant at 10%; * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimation is by OLS with fixed effects as defined in the table. 





Table A2: Sensitivity analysis. Dependent variable = consumption goods share of 
exports. 
Panel A: More balanced panel 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) ln(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃) -0.064 -0.048 -0.118     
 (0.022)** (0.050) (0.035)**     ln(𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟 𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝)      -0.057 -0.033 -0.048 
     (0.021)** (0.037) (0.025)+ 
𝑅𝑅2 0.04 0.04 0.47  0.03 0.04 0.51 
𝑁𝑁 × 𝑇𝑇  2,429 2,429 2,429  2,026 2,026 2,026 
N 144 144 144  119 119 119 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Country time trend   Yes    Yes 
 
Panel B: Weighted Regression 
 (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) ln(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃) -0.057 -0.044 -0.108     
 (0.021)** (0.046) (0.035)**     ln(𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟 𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝)     -0.050 -0.019 -0.038 
     (0.021)* (0.032) (0.025) 
𝑅𝑅2 0.03 0.04 0.46  0.02 0.04 0.48 
𝑁𝑁 × 𝑇𝑇  2,583 2,583 2,583  2,093 2,093 2,093 
N 170 170 170  130 130 130 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Country time trend   Yes    Yes 
 
Panel C: Excluding Small Countries  
 (13) (14) (15)  (16) (17) (18) ln(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃) -0.063 -0.029 -0.125     
 (0.023)** (0.049) (0.034)**     ln(𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟 𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝)     -0.061 -0.010 -0.043 
     (0.021)** (0.028) (0.025)+ 
𝑅𝑅2 0.05 0.06 0.46  0.04 0.07 0.47 
𝑁𝑁 × 𝑇𝑇  2,125 2,125 2,125  1,842 1,842 1,842 
N 127 127 127  110 110 110 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Country time trend   Yes    Yes 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors clustered by country. + Significant at 10%; * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimation is by OLS with fixed effects as defined in the table. 




Appendix B: The autarkic equilibrium 
 
To obtain the autarkic equilibrium for the Home country, set the slope of the PPF 
equal to the slope of the indifference curve. From the Cobb-Douglas utility function 







      (B1) 
To derive the PPF, first note that because of constant returns to scale in the 





     (B2) 
Where 𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻 and 𝐿𝐿2𝐻𝐻 are the total labour used in the Home country in producing the 
intermediate inputs used in goods 1 and 2. Rearranging (B2) and substituting into 
the production functions (4a), noting that in autarky, market clearing implies 𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 +
𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 and 𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿2𝐻𝐻 = 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, we have:  




𝛽𝛽+1                      and                          𝐿𝐿2𝐻𝐻 = 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽+1  (B4) 
Hence the equation of the PPF is:  
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿2𝐻𝐻 = 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻
𝛽𝛽+1 + 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽+1   (B5) 
Rearranging in terms of 𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻:  
𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽+1 − 𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑     (B6) 








     (B7) 
Setting (B7) equal to the slope of the indifference curve (B1), making use of the fact 
that autarkic market clearing implies 𝐶𝐶1𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻  and 𝐶𝐶2𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻 , and 
substituting from (B2) and (B3) gives the relationship between 𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 and 𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻:  
𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 = 𝜃𝜃1−𝜃𝜃 𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻     (B8) 
Making use of the market clearing condition 𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 + 𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 gives:  
𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 = 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻                               𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻 = (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻   (B9) 
Which is equation (5) in the text, showing how the output of intermediate inputs is 




Appendix C: Intra-industry trade 
 
From Section 3, Home’s exports and imports may be summarised as follows 
(assuming prices of intermediate inputs 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 = 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 = 1):  
Home exports of final good 1:   𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 
Home imports of final good 2:  (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 
Home exports of intermediate goods:  (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 
Home imports of intermediate goods:  𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 
Suppose that the two final goods are defined as two separate industries, and 
intermediate goods as a third industry. Then, defining the Grubel-Lloyd index of 
intra-industry trade in each industry 𝑘𝑘 as:  
𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 = 1 − |𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘−𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘|𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘+𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘      (C1) 
Where 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑀𝑀 are exports and imports. We have:  
𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 2𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹]−1               𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖         𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 ≤ (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻2(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹]−1       𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖       𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 ≥ (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻     (C2) 
𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑 1 = 𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑 2 = 0    (C3) 
And, defining the trade-weighted Grubel-Lloyd index as a summary measure of a 
country’s intra-industry trade:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 = ∑ �𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 × � 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘+𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘∑ (𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘+𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘)𝑘𝑘 ��𝑘𝑘     (C4) 
We have:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 = � 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹]−1               𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖           𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 ≤ (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹]−1       𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖           𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 ≥ (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  (C5) 










= −𝜃𝜃(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)[(1−𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹]2 < 0  (C6) 









= 𝜃𝜃(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)[(1−𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹]2 > 0  (C7) 
If 𝜃𝜃 is assumed to be equal to 0.5 (expenditure is equally divided between the two 
final goods), then the interpretation is straightforward. If the Home country is larger 
than the Foreign country (the first case), the TWGL index is negatively related to 
Home country size, while the reverse is true if Home is smaller than Foreign (the 
second case). In other words, the TWGL index is positively related to the size of the 
smaller of the two countries, and negatively related to the size of the larger of the 
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two countries. This of course is the same prediction as in models of trade under 
imperfect competition, and which has received empirical support elsewhere (see 





Appendix D: Model based on monopolistic competition 
 
As noted in the text, one of the objectives of this paper is to show that a model of 
trade in intermediate and final goods can be developed based on perfect competition, 
which yields similar results to a model based on monopolistic competition. In this 
Appendix, we derive the model assuming monopolistic competition in the production 
of intermediate goods. The results of this model are compared to the model in the 
text, in Section 4.  
 
Consumer utility takes the same form as equation (1) in the text. The two final 
goods can be assembled costlessly from the intermediate goods, using the following 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production functions in the two countries:  
𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝛾𝛾�∑𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻𝜌𝜌 + ∑𝑥𝑥1𝐹𝐹𝜌𝜌 �1𝜌𝜌                      𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻 = �∑𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻𝜌𝜌 + ∑𝑥𝑥2𝐹𝐹𝜌𝜌 �1𝜌𝜌  (D1a) 
𝑄𝑄1𝐹𝐹 = �∑𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻𝜌𝜌 + ∑𝑥𝑥1𝐹𝐹𝜌𝜌 �1𝜌𝜌                           𝑄𝑄2𝐹𝐹 = 𝛾𝛾�∑𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻𝜌𝜌 + ∑𝑥𝑥2𝐹𝐹𝜌𝜌 �1𝜌𝜌  (D1b) 
Where 0 < 𝜌𝜌 < 1 . Each intermediate good is produced by a single firm under 
monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale, and the technology for 
producing intermediate inputs is the same across countries. Following Krugman 
(1980) and Ethier (1982), labour used in each intermediate input is given by 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 +
𝛽𝛽𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 . As is well-known in the literature, assuming symmetry across firms, the 
equilibrium price and output of each intermediate input and the number of varieties 
are:  
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝜌𝜌                           𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽(1−𝜌𝜌)                          𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 = 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗(1−𝜌𝜌)𝛼𝛼   (D2) 
It was shown in Appendix B that each intermediate input is used in each final good 
in the following proportions:  
𝑥𝑥1𝑗𝑗 = 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗                                     𝑥𝑥2𝑗𝑗 = (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗   (D3) 
In autarky, substituting from (D3) and (D2) into (D1a) the output of the two final 
goods in Home is:  
𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝛾𝛾[𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻(𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻)𝜌𝜌]1𝜌𝜌 = 𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃 �𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(1−𝜌𝜌)𝛼𝛼 �1𝜌𝜌 � 𝛼𝛼𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽(1−𝜌𝜌)�    (D4a) 
𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻 = {𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻]𝜌𝜌}1𝜌𝜌 = (1 − 𝜃𝜃) �𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(1−𝜌𝜌)𝛼𝛼 �1𝜌𝜌 � 𝛼𝛼𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽(1−𝜌𝜌)�   (D4b) 










1−𝜃𝜃 = 𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃 � 𝛼𝛼𝜌𝜌
𝛽𝛽(1−𝜌𝜌)� �1−𝜌𝜌𝛼𝛼 �1𝜌𝜌 �𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜃𝜃)1−𝜃𝜃�𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻1−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌    (D5) 
Under free international trade, with Home specialising in final good 1 and Foreign in 
final good 2, the world output of the two final goods is:  
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𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝛾𝛾[(𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 + 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹)(𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻)𝜌𝜌]1𝜌𝜌 = 𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃 �(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)(1−𝜌𝜌)𝛼𝛼 �1𝜌𝜌 � 𝛼𝛼𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽(1−𝜌𝜌)�   (D6a) 
𝑄𝑄2𝐹𝐹 = 𝛾𝛾{(𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 + 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹)[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻]𝜌𝜌}1𝜌𝜌 = 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜃𝜃) �(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)(1−𝜌𝜌)𝛼𝛼 �1𝜌𝜌 � 𝛼𝛼𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽(1−𝜌𝜌)�  (D6b) 
Hence per capita utility under free trade is:  
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝛾𝛾 � 𝛼𝛼𝜌𝜌
𝛽𝛽(1−𝜌𝜌)� �1−𝜌𝜌𝛼𝛼 �1𝜌𝜌 �𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜃𝜃)1−𝜃𝜃�(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)1−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌    (D7) 
The gains from trade are given by dividing (D7) by (D5):  
𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻 = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 = �𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �1−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 𝛾𝛾1−𝜃𝜃 > 1     (D8) 
Similarly to equation (12) in Section 3, there are two components to the gains from 
trade: that which depends on the larger number of varieties of inputs [(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹) 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻⁄ ](1−𝜌𝜌) 𝜌𝜌⁄ , and that which depends on comparative advantage (𝛾𝛾1−𝜃𝜃).  
 
Following the same steps as in Section 3, the value of Home’s final good output in 
free trade is:  
𝑃𝑃1𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝑃𝑃1𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃 �(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)(1−𝜌𝜌)𝛼𝛼 �1𝜌𝜌 � 𝛼𝛼𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽(1−𝜌𝜌)�    (D9) 
While the value of intermediate inputs used in its production is:  
𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻(𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 + 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹)𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 = 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝜃𝜃 �(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)(1−𝜌𝜌)𝛼𝛼 � � 𝛼𝛼𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽(1−𝜌𝜌)�   (D10) 
If there is free entry and exit, then profits are zero, and these two expressions are 
equal to each other, so setting the price of intermediates 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 = 1 allows us to solve for 
the relative price of final good 1:  
𝑃𝑃1 = �1𝑑𝑑� �(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)(1−𝜌𝜌)𝛼𝛼 �1− 1𝜌𝜌     (D11) 
The value of final goods exports of Home is, making use of (D6a) and (D11):  
𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹
𝑃𝑃1𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝜌𝜌𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝛽𝛽        (D12) 
The value of intermediate goods exports of Home is, making use of 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 = 1 and (D2):  (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 = 𝜌𝜌(1−𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽      (D13) 
Hence, the value of Home’s exports of the final good as a share of Home’s total 
exports is:  
𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹[𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻]−1     (D14) 




Figure 1: Scatterplot of consumption goods as a share of total exports against GDP, 
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